Sardar Patel had vision to address needs of border States
05 Nov 2013
It was raining and cold outside. I was sitting with my local hosts around a smokeless chula installed in the centre of the main room of their house.
I was in Menchuka, the remotest large village before the McMahon Line dividing India and China, in West Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh.
After watching some cricket match between India and Australia (I don’t understand anything of cricket), my hosts from the Adi community (one of the 25 main tribes of Arunachal Pradesh) switched their satellite TV to a news channel.
The Indian Prime Minister was seen with the Chief Minister of Gujarat inaugurating a large statue of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. When I asked if they were following Indian politics, my friends replied, “Of course! We Arunachalis are the most patriotic people of the country, though the leadership in Delhi seems ignorant about this simple truth.”
It is true that a few minutes earlier, they had been frantically supporting the Blue Team against the Aussies.
They were now amazed by the size of the statue and kept repeating, “We need a strong leader to rule India”. Though not particularly enamoured of the BJP, they believed Narendra Modi could be the ‘next Iron Man’ to protect them.
When I asked why they thought so, they said only an ‘Iron Man’ could bring roads and development to the border areas.
Menchuka, located some 50 km from the LAC (McMahon Line) witnessed the ‘visit’ of the Chinese 51 years ago. Some old people still remember their stay for nearly one month in November 1962. I was told, “The Chinese soldiers were not aggressive; they just told us: ‘You are Chinese like us, we will never harm you; you don’t have long noses like the Indians, your eyes and skins are similar to ours’.”Today Beijing still calls the area ‘Southern Tibet’.
It is a fact that while in Menchuka, the PLA did not take food or disturb the local tribal Adis or Membas. Despite this, the local population has remained loyal to India. Unfortunately, Delhi does not often acknowledge this.
The declaration of Narendra Modi — “Every Indian regrets Sardar Patel did not become the first Prime Minister. Had he been the first Prime Minister, the country’s fate and face would have been completely different” – rang true in this remote administrative Circle of Arunachal Pradesh (it takes nine hours by car to reach Menchuka from Along, the district headquarters).
Warming up around the chula, the famous letter sent Sardar to Jawaharlal Nehru, five weeks before the Deputy Prime Minister prematurely passed away, was constantly present in my mind.
For the people of the border areas, it would have indeed been different if Gandhi had not interfered in the democratic process (Patel had been elected to lead the interim Government in 1946, but Gandhi preferred ‘the Haddows Boy’) and if Patel had become Prime Minister.
On November 7, 1950, a month after Tibet was invaded, Patel told Nehru: “I have tried to peruse this correspondence [between KM Panikkar and the Communist Government in Beijing] as favourably to our Ambassador and the Chinese Government as possible, but I regret to say that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study.”
The ‘Iron Man’ added: “The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they manage to instil into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. …the action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is little short of perfidy.”
Patel’s conclusion was: “From the latest position, it appears that we shall be not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama.” It was already too late.
Panikkar was not only “at great pain to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions,” but Nehru did not even have the courtesy to acknowledge Patel’s letter which suggested to review:
» A Military and Intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and internal security.
» An examination of military position and such redisposition of our forces as might be necessary…
» An appraisement of strength of our forces … A long-term consideration of our defense needs.
» The question of Chinese entry into UNO.
» The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our Northern and North-Eastern frontier.
» Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless in these areas and with the frontier outposts.
It is tragic that 63 years later, there is still no road for the last 37 km between the McMahon Line and Menchuka (though I was told the construction may start soon). The situation is much worse in the adjoining sub-division of Menigong. From Tato, another sub-divisional headquarters to Menigong, it takes some 7 to 8 hours to cover 67 km, and then, there is no road going onward to the border.
Ironically, during my visit to Menchuka, the Chinese announced the opening of a highway linking Metok, “The last roadless county in China” with neighboring Bomi town, located just north of the McMahon Line.
The Communist Party said that the 117-km highway, costing $155 million, will make the border town accessible for 8 to 9 months a year.
My local friends kept repeating with some envy in their voices, “The Chinese are very much in advance on us”.
To come back to Patel’s ‘clairvoyant testament’, it is not well-known that it was based on a note prepared by Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs.
Does this note still exist? I was recently told that some of the Bajpai Papers may have followed the fate of the Coalgate files.
Why did Nehru, the then Foreign Minister, not act on his Foreign Secretary’s Report while it was Patel who was concerned by the issue of having an “unscrupulous, unreliable and determined power at the doors”?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Nehru saw China as India’s best friend, if not brother.
Another reason why Patel would have made a difference is that he would have surrounded himself with efficient down-to-earth officers like Bajpai and not glamourous, worthless collaborators like KM Panikkar.
A few years later, Bajpai compared the protests of Panikkar with Neville Chamberlain’s disapproval of Nazi Germany entering Czechoslovakia in 1938, he said, “Our Ambassador has allowed himself to be influenced more by the Chinese point of view, the Chinese claims, the Chinese maps and by regards for Chinese susceptibilities than by his instructions or by India’s interests.”
Nehru did it again in 1962 when he listened to an arrogant Corps Commander, ignoring the Army hierarchy’s sounder counsels.
It is not enough to be a strong man; a leader of worth should be able to surround himself with wise advisors. Patel showed, at the time of the integration of the Indian States (with VP Menon) or later in the case of Tibet (with GS Bajpai), that he was more than an Iron Man, he was also able to find and listen to knowledgeable collaborators.
A small post-scriptum: Patel would have also made a difference in the Kashmir issue. On December 23, 1947, as Deputy Prime Minister, Patel wrote a draft letter to Nehru, “Your letter of today has been received just now at 7 pm and I am writing immediately to tell you this. It has caused me considerable pain.” Patel did want India to appeal to the UN, “Your letter makes it clear to me that I must not, or at least cannot continue as a Member of Government and hence I am hereby tendering my resignation.”
Gandhi asked Patel to withdraw his resignation. The rest is painful history.
It is unfortunate for India that history cannot be rewritten. But one can at least learn from history.
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Patel, Nehru and Big Business
Bhupesh Bhandari
November 8, 2013
New Delhi
[Imagine the possibilities if India had unleashed entrepreneurship way back in 1947 and not in 1991. A whole generation of entrepreneurs was lost to the licence raj]
Narendra Modi's recent observation that India's fate would have been different had Sardar Patel been the country's first prime minister, instead of Jawaharlal Nehru, has caused a stampede of public opinion.
Differences between the two leaders were insignificant, some have said, and these actually proved healthy for the nascent democracy. Others have said that Mr Modi has been able to lay claim to Patel only because theCongress is a party of sycophants and no leader outside the first family can lay claim to greatness. Still others have said that Mr Modi cannot be Patel's political heir because of his hardline attitude towards the minorities.
But Mr Modi's poser remains unanswered.
"What if" questions are always tricky to answer. But one thing is for sure: unlike Nehru, Patel did not view businessmen with suspicion. Maybe if he were prime minister, India wouldn't have gone down the socialist path that put shackles on business. Maybe because of that, we would have done better than the Hindu rate of growth. Imagine the possibilities if India had unleashed entrepreneurship way back in 1947 and not in 1991. South Korea and India were at similar levels of development in 1947 when they gained independence; look at the difference between the two now. A whole generation of entrepreneurs was lost to the licence raj.
Nehru's dalliances with socialism started in the early 1930s. The West was in the grip of the Great Depression, while Soviet Russia was rapidly industrialising under successive five-year plans. This left a great impression on his mind. In his presidential address to the Lucknow session of the Congress in April 1936, Nehru advocated socialism: the end of private property and the profit system. This prompted 21 "mercantile leaders" of Bombay to publish a manifesto against Nehru in The Times of India and The Tribune on May 20. According to business historian Gita Piramal, seven of these were Tata men - though J R D Tata was not among them - which suggested that the business group had played a big role in the manifesto. One of the other signatories was shipping magnate Walchand Hirachand, who felt Nehru would use his position as Congress president to propagate his ideas and sideline "sensible" men like Patel.
Patel was never hostile towards business and recognised its vital role in the economy. He was particularly close to Ghanshyamdas Birla. The two would go for walks together whenever they were in the same city and would also frequently lunch together.Nehru, on the other hand, thought Birla supported the Hindu lobby within the Congress. Agnostic to the core, Nehru found no place for religion in public life. Birla, on the other hand, found Nehru's sympathies for the Soviet Union and his socialist bent of mind a bit too much to handle. In 1936, Birla wrote to Mahatma Gandhi: "In London, Nehru was making speeches that Russia was India's best friend and Japan a weakening power. I don't know about Russia, but I definitely know that Japan is not a weakening power."
Did Patel's closeness to Birla bother Nehru? "Pundit-ji [Nehru] felt we were Patel-ji's men, with the result that Pundit-ji didn't look upon us with great warmth," Ms Piramal quotes Basant Kumar, Birla's son, in her book, Business Legends. She suggests that Birla may have met Nehru after Patel's death, in 1950, to explain that though Birla and Patel were close, there was never any intention to cause Nehru hurt. Those who dismiss the differences between the two leaders as "academic" or "creative" would do well to read the book.
Nehru's dalliances with socialism started in the early 1930s. The West was in the grip of the Great Depression, while Soviet Russia was rapidly industrialising under successive five-year plans. This left a great impression on his mind. In his presidential address to the Lucknow session of the Congress in April 1936, Nehru advocated socialism: the end of private property and the profit system. This prompted 21 "mercantile leaders" of Bombay to publish a manifesto against Nehru in The Times of India and The Tribune on May 20. According to business historian Gita Piramal, seven of these were Tata men - though J R D Tata was not among them - which suggested that the business group had played a big role in the manifesto. One of the other signatories was shipping magnate Walchand Hirachand, who felt Nehru would use his position as Congress president to propagate his ideas and sideline "sensible" men like Patel.
Patel was never hostile towards business and recognised its vital role in the economy. He was particularly close to Ghanshyamdas Birla. The two would go for walks together whenever they were in the same city and would also frequently lunch together.Nehru, on the other hand, thought Birla supported the Hindu lobby within the Congress. Agnostic to the core, Nehru found no place for religion in public life. Birla, on the other hand, found Nehru's sympathies for the Soviet Union and his socialist bent of mind a bit too much to handle. In 1936, Birla wrote to Mahatma Gandhi: "In London, Nehru was making speeches that Russia was India's best friend and Japan a weakening power. I don't know about Russia, but I definitely know that Japan is not a weakening power."
Did Patel's closeness to Birla bother Nehru? "Pundit-ji [Nehru] felt we were Patel-ji's men, with the result that Pundit-ji didn't look upon us with great warmth," Ms Piramal quotes Basant Kumar, Birla's son, in her book, Business Legends. She suggests that Birla may have met Nehru after Patel's death, in 1950, to explain that though Birla and Patel were close, there was never any intention to cause Nehru hurt. Those who dismiss the differences between the two leaders as "academic" or "creative" would do well to read the book.
In September 1947, Patel insisted Gandhi should stay in Birla House in New Delhi in view of the growing threat to his life. After Gandhi was assassinated on January 30, 1948, by a Hindu fanatic in the lawns of Birla House, Nehru wanted the house to become a national monument. Birla wasn't keen because of his close association with Gandhi.
Patel joined the fight on Birla's side. He wrote to Nehru from Mussoorie, where he happened to be staying with the industrialist, saying that the "public clamour [for a museum] would not have attained these dimensions if we had been bold enough [do you sense a dig here at Nehru?] to give a correct lead by making known our own opinion publicly to the people". Gandhi, Patel said, wouldn't have liked the idea of having a museum named after him. The museum, he added, "involves violence of the worst kind to the feelings of both Ghanshyamdas and Bapu". If he still insisted on taking over Birla House, Patel suggested, Nehru should make available to Birla an alternative site in Delhi to build a house for which he would adequately compensate the government. Nehru rushed to Mussoorie to placate Birla and Patel. In 1971, Birla House finally became government property.
The relationship between leaders and businessmen is unidimensional - it's driven by the principle of mutual benefit. And businessmen are practical (and also often unscrupulous) people. That's why they never get into open confrontation with leaders. That Lala Shri Ram of Delhi Cloth Mills dared to take on Patel (before Independence) shows that businessmen did not see him as vindictive. In 1931, Patel, who was raising funds for the Congress, had sent Bhulabhai Desai to Lala Shri Ram for his contribution. Lala Shri Ram readily agreed to the request and paid Rs 10,000. Patel was not happy with the amount. He conveyed through Desai that a higher payment would be less expensive than a strike in the DCM mills. Lala Shri Ram was infuriated and told Desai that he wouldn't budge under any threat. Patel realised that Lala Shri Ram could not be bullied. The two reconciled. Patel became a regular visitor to Lala Shri Ram's house in New Delhi.
Patel joined the fight on Birla's side. He wrote to Nehru from Mussoorie, where he happened to be staying with the industrialist, saying that the "public clamour [for a museum] would not have attained these dimensions if we had been bold enough [do you sense a dig here at Nehru?] to give a correct lead by making known our own opinion publicly to the people". Gandhi, Patel said, wouldn't have liked the idea of having a museum named after him. The museum, he added, "involves violence of the worst kind to the feelings of both Ghanshyamdas and Bapu". If he still insisted on taking over Birla House, Patel suggested, Nehru should make available to Birla an alternative site in Delhi to build a house for which he would adequately compensate the government. Nehru rushed to Mussoorie to placate Birla and Patel. In 1971, Birla House finally became government property.
The relationship between leaders and businessmen is unidimensional - it's driven by the principle of mutual benefit. And businessmen are practical (and also often unscrupulous) people. That's why they never get into open confrontation with leaders. That Lala Shri Ram of Delhi Cloth Mills dared to take on Patel (before Independence) shows that businessmen did not see him as vindictive. In 1931, Patel, who was raising funds for the Congress, had sent Bhulabhai Desai to Lala Shri Ram for his contribution. Lala Shri Ram readily agreed to the request and paid Rs 10,000. Patel was not happy with the amount. He conveyed through Desai that a higher payment would be less expensive than a strike in the DCM mills. Lala Shri Ram was infuriated and told Desai that he wouldn't budge under any threat. Patel realised that Lala Shri Ram could not be bullied. The two reconciled. Patel became a regular visitor to Lala Shri Ram's house in New Delhi.
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