Why is India hosting CIA and Taliban?
14 Nov 2013
By facilitating a meeting between America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Afghan Taliban in Goa, the UPA Government seems to have unilaterally compromised India’s strategic interests in Kabul and its friendly relations with Tehran, besides ‘forgiving’ the Taliban for its dubious role during the hijack of Indian Airlines aircraft IC-814 by Pakistani terrorists in 1999.Although an obliging media has maintained discreet silence on the issue, the episode would be known to all major world capitals, particularly as Sartaj Aziz, advisor to Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, was in New Delhi at the same time, meeting separatist leaders from Jammu & Kashmir.
As Union Finance Minister P Chidambaram (also a former Home Minister) was present at the same Tehelka-sponsored event in Goa, it is inconceivable that all these events were not closely coordinated and connected. The development is bound to have a grim fallout for India, as Pakistan is a close ally of the Taliban, which is detested by Iran, and has traditionally been distrusted by India. Indeed, this is the reason why the Hamid Karzai regime allowed New Delhi to have a presence in Afghanistan and participate in its reconstruction, and undertake humanitarian activities among civilian victims of landmines, and so on.
India has also been assisting the Afghan Government by training its Army and Police for the post-US withdrawal era, and all this is likely to be compromised as the neighbourhood begins to see India as an increasingly unreliable friend. Both Kathmandu and Colombo already view New Delhi with dismay. The Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef was ostensibly given a visa after clearance by the intelligence agencies but without the knowledge of either the Union Home Ministry or External Affairs Ministry. He was sitting in the same hall when P Chidambaram addressed a session of Tehelka’s THiNK 2013. Thereafter, Mullah Zaeef had an open dialogue (November 9) with Robert Grenier, former director of the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Centre and one of the key actors in its anti-Taliban policy after September 11, 2001.
It is inconceivable that the two men, and possibly other members of the US embassy in India, did not have wide-ranging discussions on a range of issues. It is baffling why India hosted this gathering, and if the Opposition BJP was in the loop. It bears stating, however, that throughout his public interaction in India, Mullah Zaeef did not apologise or even express regret at Harkat-ul-Mujahideen’s hijacking of an Indian Airlines Airbus from Kathmandu’s Tribhuvan International Airport on Christmas eve, 1999, and bringing it to Kandahar, then under the thumb of the Taliban.
One passenger, Rupin Katyal, was fatally stabbed. That, and the positioning of well-armed Taliban fighters near the aircraft to prevent Indian special forces from storming the plane, forced the Atal Bihari Vajpayee Government to release three dreaded terrorists – Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar (active in training terrorists in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir), Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh responsible for the kidnapping and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl), and Maulana Masood Azhar (founder of Jaish-e-Mohammed which is allegedly behind the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001) – to secure the safe passage of the 176 passengers and crew.
Now, New Delhi has permitted this key Taliban leader and close confidant of its chief Mullah Mohammed Omar, to avail of Indian hospitality to strike a deal with the United States, which is desperate for a deal with the Taliban to cover its retreat from that country in 2014, as 12 years of warfare have ended in abject failure. Mullah Zaeef fled to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and returned as a jihadi in 1983. It goes without saying that he was among the mujahideen trained and armed by Pakistani President General Zia ul Haq with American arms and funds.
After the Soviet withdrawal, he helped found the Taliban in 1994. As a Minister, he negotiated with foreign oil companies and with the Afghan resistance leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud. In an hour long ‘dialogue’ mediated by journalist Shoma Choudhary (it was actually three parallel speeches to the audience), Zaeef spoke about the post-Soviet exit and America’s demand that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden for bombings in Tanzania and East Africa.
Osama, he reminded the audience, was ‘inherited’ by the Taliban as he was already in the country when they came to power. So Taliban asked Washington to furnish evidence of his role in the alleged crimes, further to which he would be tried under the Sharia; alternately, they were willing to send him to another Islamic country, or even to The Hague, but Washington was adamant that he be handed over to them. Under Pashtun culture, Zaeef said, it was difficult to abandon Osama completely. Richard Grenier, however, defended American intransigence, pointing out that the choices for America became ‘very limited after 9/11′; that the Taliban were untrustworthy and hence compromise was not possible.
Interestingly, Zaeef revealed that as envoy in Islamabad, he learnt one month before 9/11, from the American ambassador there, that a major event was being planned on American soil, from Afghan soil. He conveyed this to his bosses, but they categorically said that Taliban was not planning anything and would not permit any hostile activity from its soil. But when 9/11 happened, President Bush immediately blamed Osama bin Laden, but denied evidence of his involvement.
When the Taliban finally asked Osama to leave their country, America insisted that it wanted to search the country for other reasons; Zaeef himself wrote directly to George Bush, but the rest is history… It was America that created Osama in the first place, he said, adding that Osama was a “minor player” in the anti-Soviet jihad, but “took it several steps from there”.
Zaeef told the audience that Bruce Riedel, US security and counter terrorism expert, was also supposed to come to Goa. This suggests that New Delhi under the UPA has, for the first time since the Cold War, taken a blatantly pro-American position vis-à-vis the US attempt to tailor the politics of South Asia to its current thinking (whatever that may be, and whatever measure of success it may ultimately enjoy). If this assessment is correct, this is treacherous ground, and calls for greater national transparency and debate. Foreign policy impinges on national security, even territorial integrity, and cannot be conducted covertly.
Richard Grenier tried to defend American policy, but mostly fudged issues as he had quit the CIA on account of his opposition to drone warfare. He said Taliban made Afghanistan a safe haven for terrorists, and that Washington made counter terror and counter insurgency a tool of war, with ‘signature strikes’ in populated areas, which did not go down well with the people due to the huge cost to non-combatants. Drones had worked well in Pakistan when focussed on individuals about whom there was clear evidence that they presented a danger to society; in Afghanistan it was a different story.
America, Zaeef said, had brought the form of democracy to Afghanistan, but this democracy never reflected the will of the people. Now, the American exit will increase political instability; already people are sending capital out of the country; this will impact employment and make for a dim future. A major American legacy, which also happened after the Soviet Union left, was the creation of militias; these are going to create problems for the successor regime.
Zaeef recalled that when Hamid Karzai took over, he declared an amnesty for Taliban and told the leadership to go unmolested to their homes and be secure. But within a week, America began a policy of buying Taliban for $5000 each, and that is how he and many others ended up in Guantanamo (they were sold by Pakistan). The Taliban were forced to flee Afghanistan and go to Pakistan, which did further damage. The ‘big game’ of politics and economics “continues in our country and people cannot understand the conspiracy….”
Grenier agreed that after 12 years of war, America’s arrogant belief that Afghanistan was too important to be left to the Afghans had failed. Post-2014, it was up to the Afghans to work things out for themselves, and one problem was that the Taliban “don’t want to engage to other political actors in the country”. He feared a collapse to civil war as the Taliban are not in complete command all over country; hence safe havens for terrorists could continue. All in all, a bleak situation.
On November 10, an unscheduled session was organised for Mullah Zaeef to satisfy the audience on the issue of women’s education, rights, and public role. A skilled orator, he stuck doggedly to his talking points, viz, the Taliban priority on coming to power last time was to disarm the militias, unite the nation, and install a national Government to take care of national security. Women’s rights, he seemed to suggest, fell way behind these priorities; he artfully dodged the bombing of schools and other atrocities.
Neither his hosts asked him about the Taliban role in 1999, and he did not seize any of the ample moments available to explain, much less apologise, for the tragedy of IC-814, and the subsequent actions of the men released to save the lives of the passengers.
But the Indian Government owes the nation an explanation, and all political parties need to make their position clear on the multiple issues thrown up by this unexpected guest.
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